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iiIn this appendix, I provide details on the data and computational methods used in “Capital
Taxation During the U.S. Great Depression.” I also conduct sensitivity analyses of the main
results. Finally I provide evidence about the impact of capital taxation in several postwar episodes.
Materials needed to replicate the results are available at www.minneapolisfed.org/research and
listed under Staﬀ Reports 451 (the main paper) and 452 (this appendix).
1. U.S. Data
The main sources for the data used in my analysis of the U.S. Great Depression are:1
• the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which publishes the
U.S. national income and product accounts and ﬁxed asset tables in the Survey of Current
Business (SCB hereafter);
• Goldsmith (1962) for measures of capital stocks that are not included in the BEA ﬁxed asset
tables;
• Kendrick (1961) for manhours;
• the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Internal Revenue, which publishes data from
federal income tax returns in the Statistics of Income (SOI hereafter); and
• the Tax Research Foundation, which published tax rate schedules for U.S. states in a changing
series titled variously Federal and State Tax Systems, Tax Systems of the World, and Tax
Systems.
NIPA tables referenced below are the main tables of the National Income and Product Ac-
counts found in the SCB. FA tables referenced below are the main tables of the BEA’s Fixed
Assets. Auxiliary references are discussed where relevant.
1.1. National Accounts and Capital Stocks
Gross domestic product (GDP), components of GDP, and capital stocks are all divided by popu-
lation midyear (NIPA Table 2.1), which is plotted in Figure 1. At the start of the Depression, the
U.S. population was close to 122 million. By 1939, it had risen to 131 million.
1 Data for other time periods are described later.
1In addition to dividing by population, I make several adjustments to make the data consistent
with theory. Speciﬁcally, I deﬁne adjusted GDP to be GDP (NIPA Table 1.1.5) less sales taxes
(NIPA Table 3.5) plus imputed capital rents (equal to 4.1 percent of the stock of consumer durables
in FA Table 1.1 plus ﬁxed government capital in FA Table 1.1) plus depreciation of consumer
durables (FA Table 1.3). To convert to real dollars, the adjusted GDP series is then divided by
the GDP deﬂator (NIPA Table 1.1.9). In Figure 2, I plot this adjusted series after dividing it by
the population in Figure 1 and 1.019t−1929, t = 1929,...,1939. The latter is an estimate of the
growth factor for labor-augmenting technical change. To convert the series into an index, I divide
it by the 1929 value and multiply by 100.
Next, consider the main components of GDP. Consumption is deﬁned to be personal con-
sumption expenditures (NIPA Table 1.1.5) less PCE durables (NIPA Table 1.1.5) plus imputed
capital rents (equal to 4.1 percent of the stock of consumer durables in FA Table 1.1 plus ﬁxed
government capital in FA Table 1.1) plus depreciation of consumer durables (FA Table 1.3) less a
prorated portion of sales taxes on nondurables and services (NIPA Table 3.5). To convert to real
dollars, the consumption series—along with all components of income and product—is divided by
the GDP deﬂator. Finally, I divide the consumption series by the population times 1.019t−1929
times the 1929 level of adjusted GDP and then multiply by 100. The result is shown in Figure 3.
Note that the 1929 value shown in the ﬁgure is the share of nondurables plus services (adjusted
for taxes and capital services) in output of that year. This share, which is equal to 68 percent, is
used later when parameterizing the models.
Investment is deﬁned to be gross private domestic investment (NIPA Table 1.1.5) plus net
exports (NIPA Table 1.1.5) plus government investment (NIPA Table 3.1) plus PCE durables
(NIPA Table 1.1.5) less a prorated portion of sales taxes on durables (NIPA Table 3.5). To deﬂate
and detrend the series, I use the same procedure as with consumption. Detrended real investment
is plotted in Figure 4.
Government spending is deﬁned to be government consumption (NIPA Table 3.1). To deﬂate
and detrend this series, I again use the same procedure as with consumption.
Figure 5 plots the actual detrended series along with a smooth trend. All exogenous inputs
are ﬁrst ﬁltered using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter (with smoothing parameter equal to
21) before being fed into the models described later. I do this because these values are the basis of
expectations of future spending and tax rates. In the case of the extended model, the computation
is easier if expected future paths are smooth.
For the extended model, GDP and investment are subdivided into components for business
and nonbusiness. Business GDP is the sum of corporate proﬁts (NIPA Table 1.10) plus nonfarm
proprietors’ income (NIPA Table 1.12) plus compensation, net interest, and consumption of ﬁxed
capital of corporate business (NIPA Table 1.14) plus compensation and net interest of sole propri-
etorships and partnerships (available prior to 2002 in NIPA Table 1.15) plus nonfarm proprietors’
consumption of ﬁxed capital (NIPA Table 7.5) plus taxes on imports and production (NIPA Table
1.10) less taxes on imports and production of the housing sector (NIPA Table 7.4.5) and farm
sector (NIPA Table 7.3.5) and less sales taxes (NIPA Table 3.5). Nonbusiness GDP is GDP as
deﬁned above less business GDP.
Business investment is the sum of ﬁxed investment of corporations plus nonfarm proprietors
(FA Table 6.7) plus a change in inventories (NIPA Table 1.1.5) less a change in farm inventories
(NIPA Table 7.3.5). Nonbusiness investment is investment as deﬁned above less business invest-
ment.
The nonbusiness subcomponents of GDP and investment—after the series has been deﬂated
and detrended—are plotted in Figures 6 and 7. In addition, I plot the smoothed series after
applying the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter.
The total value of all U.S. corporations is not available for this period, but an estimate for the
index plotted in Figure 8 is constructed using the New York Stock Exchange market capitalization
found in annual supplements of the SCB (1932–1950).
1.2. Hours Per Capita
Hours used in the study are total manhours from Kendrick (1961). The fraction of time at work
is total manhours divided by time available for work, which is assumed to be 5,000 hours per year
times the number of persons over 16. The population over 16 is from the U.S. Department of
Commerce (1975, Series A39). In Figure 9, I plot per capita hours as a fraction of time at work.
In 1929, 29 percent of available time was devoted to work.
3For the extended model, I need business and nonbusiness hours. For nonbusiness hours, I use
Kendrick’s (1961) manhours for farm plus government. Nonbusiness hours per capita are plotted
in Figure 10 along with the ﬁltered series, which is used as an input for the numerical simulations.
Business hours are then found residually by taking total hours less nonbusiness hours.
1.3. Tax Rates
I turn next to estimates for tax rates. The constructed tax rates, along with smoothed series
used in the computer codes, are shown in Figures 11–16. The main text describes how all are
constructed. Here I will provide more detail about the original sources of the data.
The average marginal tax rate on labor income constructed from federal and state individual
tax returns is shown in Figure 11. The source of this series is Barro and Redlick (2011, Table 1),
and the speciﬁc rate used is listed as “overall marginal tax rate.”
Figure 12 shows the marginal tax rate schedule for dividend income (which was subject only
to surtaxes prior to 1936). Figure 13 shows the average marginal tax rate on dividend income.
The main source of the data used for constructing the federal rate is SOI, Tables 2 and 7, which
provide detailed information from individual returns by net income class; speciﬁcally, these tables
show number of returns, exemptions, taxes, and sources of income for each net income class.
Total dividends are found in NIPA Table 2.1 (Personal Income and its Disposition). For the
years 1936–1939, adjustments to total dividends on federal returns are made because the IRS
did not consistently record dividends for ﬁduciaries for all years in my sample. In other words,
dividend income listed in SOI Table 7 includes dividend income of ﬁduciaries in years 1929–1935
but excludes it in years 1936–1939. For 1936–1939, the dividend income of ﬁduciaries is included
under “Fiduciary income.” Thus, I estimate ﬁduciary dividend income with information from IRS
Form 1041 ﬁled by ﬁduciaries. Speciﬁcally, I compute the ratio of dividend income to the balance
income (or amount available for distribution) on Form 1041 and use this as the fraction of ﬁduciary
income on Form 1040 that constitutes dividend income.
The main sources of the data used for constructing the average marginal tax rate on dividend
income by state are the SOI, Tables 2, 6, and 7, and the Tax Research Foundation (1930–1942). As
noted above, SOI Tables 2 and 7 contain information that allows me to construct the distribution
4of dividend income by net income class for federal returns; I use it as a proxy for the distribution of
dividend incomes for all states.2 SOI Table 6 shows the distribution of dividend income on federal
returns by state of residence of the ﬁler for the years 1929–1939. The Tax Research Foundation
(1930–1942) tables summarize the individual income tax rate schedules by state.
In Figure 14, I plot the statutory corporate income tax rate from the U.S. Treasury’s SOI.
This is the rate faced by ﬁrms paying taxes. To this I add Brown’s (1949) estimate of 2 percent
based on the capital stock tax that was applied in combination with an excess proﬁt tax penalty.
Figure 15 shows the eﬀective tax rate on business property based on data from NIPA Table
3.5. To construct taxes paid on property for the business sector, I sum taxes on imports and
production plus business current transfer payments (net) and subtract these taxes and transfers
for the farm (NIPA Table 7.3.5) and housing sectors (NIPA Table 7.4.5). To construct the tax
rate, I then divide taxes paid by business ﬁxed capital (FA Table 6.1) plus land and inventories
from Goldsmith (1962).
Also in Figure 15 is an alternative estimate of the tax rate on property (or more generally
wealth) that includes estate taxes. For this estimate I add estate tax revenues from U.S. Treasury
(1990) to the taxes on property and the gross estate value less debts and mortgages to the value
of the business capital stock when constructing the tax rate on property.
Finally, the eﬀective tax rate on consumption shown in Figure 16 is found by dividing sales
and excise taxes (NIPA Table 3.5) by consumption (as deﬁned above).
2 I only have data needed to construct the distribution of dividend income by net income class for one year and
one state: California in 1938. Comparing the distribution in this case with that from the federal returns, I
ﬁnd close agreement.
52. Basic Model
The one-sector neoclassical growth model analyzed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) serves as the
baseline for the conventional view described in the main text.
2.1. Household Problem
I’ll start with the household’s problem. The household chooses consumption c, investment x, and






βt [log(ct) + ψ ((1 − ht)
ϕ − 1)/ϕ]Nt
subject to ct + xt = rtkt + wtht + κt
− τhtwtht − τpt{(rt − δ − τkt)kt}
kt+1 = [(1 − δ)kt + xt]/(1 + η)
xt ≥ 0 in all states
with processes for factor prices (rt, wt), taxes (τht, τpt), and transfers (κt) given. Quantities are
in per capita terms. Nt is the number of family members. Growth in Nt is η.
I next derive the necessary ﬁrst-order conditions that I use in the computer code. The La-
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(rt − τkt)ˆ kt + (1 − τht) ˆ wtht + ˆ κt
− ˆ ct − ˆ xt
− τpt{(rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kt}
+ λt
 
(1 − δ)ˆ kt + ˆ xt − (1 + η)(1 + γ)ˆ kt+1
  
,
where ζ is a penalty parameter used to deal with the constraint xt ≥ 0. Variables that grow over
time with increasing technology are detrended, e.g., ˆ ct = ct/(1 + γ)t.
Taking derivatives with respect to all decision variables yields the following ﬁrst-order condi-
tions:
1/ˆ ct =  t (2.1)
6ψ (1 − ht)
ϕ−1 =  t (1 − τht) ˆ wt (2.2)
ζ min(ˆ xt,0)
2 + λt =  t (2.3)
(1 + η)(1 + γ)λt = ˜ βEt
 
λt+1 (1 − δ)
+  t+1
 
rt+1 − τpt+1 (rt+1 − δ)
  
. (2.4)
If I simplify these equations, I have
ψˆ ct (1 − ht)
ϕ−1 = (1 − τht) ˆ wt (2.5)
1
ˆ ct







1 + (1 − τpt+1)(rt+1 − δ)
 
− (1 − δ)ζ min(ˆ xt+1,0)
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where ˆ β = β/(1 + γ).
2.2. Factor Prices






















when variables are normalized.
2.3. Government Budget Constraint
The government’s budget constraint, written in per capita and detrended terms, is given by
ˆ gt + ˆ κt = τht ˆ wtht + τpt (rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kt.
72.4. Resource Constraint
The original resource constraint of the economy is given by
Nt (ct + xt + gt) = (Ntkt)
θ (ZtNtht)
1−θ ,
where gt is per capita spending of the government. Once I divide by population and account for
growth in technology, I have a normalized resource constraint given by




I next specify exogenous processes for {ˆ g,τh,τp,z}. Let s index the state, where s is determined
by an nth-order Markov chain. Then at time t if the state is s, gt = g(s), τht = τh(s), etc. The
process for s is intended to capture diﬀerent states of the world. Note that the state vector for the
economy is ˆ k, s.
2.6. Computation














where the functions Φj(ˆ k) are known basis functions. For the ﬁnite element method, the Φj(ˆ k)’s





= 1 − ζˆ cmin(ˆ x,0)























To speed up the computation, I will need the derivatives of R with respect to coeﬃcients
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dˆ c










































































































































To compute these expressions, I need formulas for the derivatives in these equations.
I’ll start with the next period capital, which has the derivative
dˆ k′ = dˆ x/[(1 + η)(1 + γ)]
= [(1 − θ) ˆ y/hdh − dˆ c]/[(1 + η)(1 + γ)].
Next, I’ll derive dh, which involves diﬀerentiating the intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition (2.5):
0 = d[(1 − h)
ϕ−1 hθˆ c]
















9This result shows that dh can be written as a function of dc. Next consider dh′, which is slightly
diﬀerent since it depends on dk′ as well:
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and all other derivatives are explicit or implicit functions of these.
2.7. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I discuss the results of sensitivity analysis for the basic model. Four sets of results
are discussed in which I vary expectations, estimates of tax rates, the accounting of nonbusiness
activity, and the ﬁltering of inputs. I ﬁnd that most of these simulations are nearly indistinguishable
from the benchmark simulations.
2.7.1. Vary expectations
In Figures 17–20, I compare the benchmark simulation, in which households are uncertain about
future ﬁscal policy, with a simulation, in which households have perfect foresight about future ﬁscal
policy. The model results are very close to each other and very diﬀerent from the U.S. data.
2.7.2. Use alternative tax rates
In Figures 21–24, I compare simulations for two diﬀerent choices of tax rates on labor income and
proﬁts. In the benchmark simulation, I use the estimates of Barro and Redlick (2011) for the tax
rate on labor income and the statutory rate on corporate proﬁts for the tax rate on proﬁts. In the
alternative, I use the tax rate estimates of Joines (1981), which were used by Cole and Ohanian
(1999) in their analysis of the Great Depression. Although these simulations have some minor
diﬀerences, the main conclusion of the basic model remains: ﬁscal policy played only a small role.
102.7.3. Add a nonbusiness sector
In Figures 25–28, I compare the simulations of the basic model in versions that diﬀer with respect
to the accounting of nonbusiness activity. In the benchmark simulation, I used an extremely basic
one-sector version of the growth model, with proﬁts taxes assessed on aggregate capital income. In
the alternative, I distinguish business and nonbusiness income, and the tax on proﬁts is assumed
to be levied on just business income. Since households take nonbusiness hours, investment, and
output as given, I compare their choices for business aggregates with the aggregates in the basic
one-sector model. As the ﬁgures show, adding the nonbusiness sector does not improve the ﬁt of
the basic model.
2.7.4. Use unﬁltered inputs
In Figures 29–32, I compare the benchmark results, in which the inputs are ﬁrst smoothed, with
those in which they are not. (See Figures 5–16 for the two sets of inputs.) These ﬁgures show
that using the smoothed tax series does not aﬀect the results for the basic model. The results are
nearly indistinguishable.
3. Extended Model
To the basic model, I add a richer tax structure, and because some of the capital taxes are imposed
on business incomes only, I distinguish between business and nonbusiness activity.
3.1. Household Problem
I’ll start with the household’s problem. The problem is to choose consumption ct, hours ht, and




βt[log(ct) + ψ ((1 − ht)
ϕ − 1)/ϕ]Nt
subject to
ct + xbt ≤ rtkbt + wtht + κt
− τctct − τhtwtht
− τxtxbt − τktkbt
11− τpt
 








rtkbt − xbt − τktkbt − τxtxbt
− τpt
 
rtkbt − δkbt − τktkbt
 
− τut ((1 + η)kbt+1 − kbt)
 
, (3.1)
taking as given the initial capital stocks, factor prices (rt, wt), other incomes (κ), and exogenous
shocks. Total hours ht are the sum of business hours hbt and nonbusiness hours hnt.
Constraints that must be satisﬁed in addition to the budget constraint are the capital accu-
mulation equations:
kbt+1 = [(1 − δ)kbt + xbt]/(1 + η)
and nonnegativity constraints on investment: xbt ≥ 0 for all t.
Note that I am assuming that households own the capital stocks and pay all taxes directly.
Separating the problems of households and ﬁrms will not aﬀect the equations to which I apply
the numerical algorithm. Also, I will assume that nonbusiness income, investment, and hours are
given exogenously. Here, they will be indexed by the state s.
Before deriving ﬁrst-order conditions for the problem, I ﬁrst modify the objective of the






[β (1 + η)]
t
 






If ζ = 0, this is the utility deﬁned above.
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− τpt{(rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kbt}
− τut{(1 + η)(1 + γ)ˆ kbt+1 − ˆ kbt}
 
− (1 + τct)ˆ ct − (1 + τxt) ˆ xbt
+ λt
 
(1 − δ)ˆ kbt + ˆ xbt − (1 + η)(1 + γ) ˆ kbt+1
 
.
Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, and next period capital
stocks. They are as follows:
1/ˆ ct = (1 + τct) t
ψ (1 − ht)
ϕ−1 =  t (1 − τht) ˆ wt
ζ min(ˆ xt,0)
2 + λt =  t (1 + τxt)(1 − τdt)
(1 + η)(1 + γ)(λt +  tτut (1 − τdt)) = ˜ βEt
 
λt+1 (1 − δ)
+  t+1 (1 − τdt+1)
 
rt+1 − τkt+1 − τpt+1 (rt+1 − δ − τkt+1) + τut+1
  
.
Rewriting the dynamic ﬁrst-order conditions, I get
(1 + τxt + τut)(1 − τdt)
(1 + τct)ˆ ct
− ζ min(ˆ xbt,0)
2
= ˆ βE
  (1 − τdt+1)
(1 + τct+1)ˆ ct+1
{(1 − τpt+1)(rt+1 − τkt+1)
+ (1 − δ)(1 + τxt+1) + δτpt+1 + τut+1}





Assume that the production function for business value added is
ˆ ybt = ˆ kθ
bt (zthbt)
1−θ .
In this case, the factor prices are
rt = θˆ ybt/ˆ kbt
ˆ wt = (1 − θ) ˆ ybt/hbt.
3.3. Government Budget Constraint
The government’s budget constraint, written in per capita and detrended terms, is given by
ˆ gt + ˜ κt = τctˆ ct + τht ˆ wtht + τxtˆ xbt + τktˆ kbt
+ τpt{(rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kbt}
+ τut{ˆ xbt − δˆ kbt}
+ τdt{(rbt − τkt)ˆ kbt − (1 + τxt) ˆ xbt
− τpt[(rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kbt]
− τut
 
ˆ xbt − δˆ kbt
 
},
where ˜ κ = ˆ κ + ˆ whn + ˆ xn − ˆ yn.
3.4. Resource Constraint
GDP in this economy is (after normalizing)
ˆ ybt + ˆ ynt = ˆ ct + ˆ xbt + ˆ xnt + ˆ gt.
Total output is ˆ ybt + ˆ ynt.
3.5. Exogenous Processes
The exogenous variables for this model are {ˆ g,τc,τh,τx,τk,τp,τd,z1,z2,hn, ˆ xn, ˆ yn}. The state is
indexed by s. Therefore, the full state vector for the economy is [ˆ kb, s].
143.6. Computation















The static ﬁrst-order conditions can be used to determine the current period variables, given
guesses for the decision variable c and the state variables ˆ kb and s. Start by guessing a value for
h given c and ˆ kb. If the guess for h is correct, then the following should hold exactly:
h = 1 − [(1 − τh)(1 − θ)(yb/hb)/(ψ (1 + τc)ˆ c)]
1/(ϕ−1) .
If it does not, then I update the guess for h and continue until convergence.
The unknown coeﬃcients in (3.2), which I can stack into the vector   α, are set so that the
residual of the dynamic Euler equation is approximately zero. This residual can be written as
follows:
R(kb,s;  α) = (1 + τx (s) + τu (s))(1 − τd (s))/(1 + τc (s))
− ζˆ cmin(ˆ xb,0)










 (1 − τd (s′))




(1 − τp (s′))(r′ − τk (s′))
+ (1 − δ)(1 + τx (s′)) + δτp (s′) + τu (s′)
  
,
where ˆ β = β(1 + γ)−σ. If I apply a standard ﬁnite element method, I ﬁnd   α to ensure that the
weighted sum of residual R is equal to zero.
When computing   α, I take derivatives of the residual with respect to unknown coeﬃcients;
this speeds up the numerical algorithm considerably, especially if the number of unknowns is large.
3.7. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I describe the sensitivity results with respect to the extended model.
153.7.1. Set key tax rates to zero
Two key tax rates in my analysis are the tax rate on dividend income and the tax rate on undis-
tributed proﬁts. These are demonstrated in Figures 33–36, where I show results for the benchmark
simulation along with two alternatives: one in which τdt is set equal to zero in all periods and
another in which τut is set equal to zero in all periods. When the tax rate on dividend income is
set to zero, the model completely misses the large decline in business investment. In fact, the only
reason why investment falls at all is because the nonbusiness investment falls exogenously. Simi-
larly, there is little change in consumption, GDP, and hours. When the tax rate on undistributed
proﬁts is set to zero, the model completely misses the drop in investment during the 1938 recession.
Similarly, there is less of a decline in GDP relative to trend and in per capita hours.
3.7.2. Vary expectations
Another potentially key factor in the analysis is household expectations. In Figures 37–40, I
show the results for three alternative speciﬁcations for household expectations. The ﬁrst is the
benchmark. The second assumes households in 1930 expect no change to occur in tax and spending
policies. The same is true in 1931. Because they are initially myopic, they do not anticipate a large
change in the return to investment and, therefore, the declines in investment and hours and the
rise in consumption are smaller. The third alternative for household expectations assumes perfect
foresight, which results in immediate responses in all variables; households know perfectly that
taxes and spending will rise and react right away to minimize the impact.
3.7.3. Use alternative tax rates
In Figures 41–44, I show the simulations as I vary estimated tax rates on dividend income. I
consider three alternatives: two based on earlier studies and one based on a referee’s suggestion.
Although there are some quantitative diﬀerences, the main ﬁnding that capital taxation plays an
important role during this period remains intact.
The ﬁrst alternative is the rate constructed by McGrattan and Prescott (2003). Their rate,
like mine, is the sum of rates based on federal and state returns; there are, however, two diﬀerences
between our estimates of these rates. First, in constructing the average marginal tax rate from
16federal returns, McGrattan and Prescott (2003) used the total IRS dividends as an estimate of
individual dividend income, whereas I use the NIPA personal dividends. The NIPA measure is
slightly larger and is the more appropriate rate to use, since I want to account for those paying zero
on an extra dollar of dividend income. The second and more signiﬁcant diﬀerence is the estimate
of the state tax rate. I construct an average marginal tax rate using state tax schedules, whereas
McGrattan and Prescott (2003) multiplied the rate for federal returns by a factor equal to one plus
the ratio of total state and local income taxes divided by total federal income taxes. I consider my
new estimate a more accurate estimate of the overall marginal tax rate than the earlier one.
The second alternative is from Wright (1969), who claims to estimate the average marginal
tax rate in exactly the same way that I do here, although the series is not the same. Unfortunately,
he is not speciﬁc about the coverage (that is, federal plus state or federal only), the marginal rate
used (that is, normal or surtax or both), the treatment of ﬁdiuciary dividends, or the treatment of
nonﬁlers.3 As is clear from Figures 41–44, the tax rate can make a diﬀerence for the magnitudes
in declines of economic activity, but the timing is the same. For example, with Wright’s tax rate
used for the rate on dividend income, the fall in investment is not as large, but the low point as
before is 1932 when the major tax change takes place.
The third series shown in Figures 41–44 was suggested by a referee. Instead of taking a
weighted average of marginal rates, I take a weighted average of squared marginal rates and then,
after summing them, take the square root. Feeding this result into the model, I ﬁnd a larger fall in
investment, hours, and output, which is not surprising because this new rate rises faster between
1932 and 1939 than my benchmark estimate.
3.7.4. Add exogenous wedges
In the main text, I present results for investment when I add exogenous eﬃciency wedges that
look like time-varying total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and labor wedges that look like time-
varying tax rates on labor. I choose the series so that I get a perfect ﬁt for GDP and hours of
3 I attempted to replicate his series but could not.
17work.4 Here, I display the ﬁgure for investment again along with the results for the other model
predictions. These results are shown in Figures 45 through 48.
The main message is that factors can be added that improve the overall ﬁt of consumption,
GDP, and hours without worsening the ﬁt of the model to investment. Of course, the hard part is to
ﬁnd evidence for economic factors or policies that act like large and negative shocks to productivity
and labor market conditions.5
3.7.5. Use unﬁltered inputs
In Figures 49–52, I show results when I use the unﬁltered inputs (shown in Figures 5–16) instead
of the smoothed series. I do this in two steps—ﬁrst with all series except the tax rate on dividends
and then with all series. The purpose for two steps is to demonstrate that for all but the tax rate
on dividends, using the ﬁltered versus unﬁltered inputs does not matter. The series are nearly
indistinguishable.
When the dividend tax rate is left unﬁltered, on the other hand, there are some identiﬁable
diﬀerences in the model’s equilibrium paths relative to the benchmark because the expected future
rate relative to today’s rate directly impacts the gross return to investment. I prefer to use the
smoothed rate because it is the basis of household expectations. I do not want to assume that
households have perfect knowledge of the exact variation in the ex-post marginal tax rate, averaged
across all dividend earners. I prefer instead to assume that households merely believe the rate will
rise over the decade.
3.7.6. Set policy variables constant
Above, I showed results when the key tax rates on dividends and undistributed proﬁts are set
to zero. Here, I ﬁx the other rates and government spending at their 1929 levels to demonstrate
that the main results are not changed by doing so. This is done in Figures 53–56 for tax rates on
4 If instead I use U.S. data to back out TFP and a labor wedge and feed these series back into the model as
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) do, then the ﬁt is not perfect but is close.
5 I also experiment with demand shocks that eﬀectively change the price of consumption. These do not help
with the overall ﬁt of the model because they oﬀset changes to the price of investment that arise from expected
changes in the tax rate on dividends.
18consumption (τc), tax rates on labor (τh), tax rates on property (τk), tax rates on proﬁts (τp), and
detrended government spending g.
3.7.7. Add estate taxes
In Figures 57–60, I compare results when using two diﬀerent estimates of the tax on property
(or wealth). (See Figure 15 for these rates.) Adding estate taxes implies tax rates on property
are higher after 1932 and, thus, investment, GDP, and hours of work are all lower. However, the
diﬀerences in the results are small.
4. Model with Non-Ricardian Consumers
In this section, I analyze a version of the growth model with households that live hand to mouth.
I’ll refer to them as non-Ricardian. They choose how much to work, and their consumption is
given by wage income plus government transfers. The Ricardian consumers are, as before, able to
save by investing in business capital. The point of the exercise is to see if such a model can better
account for the large drop in consumption of U.S. households during the 1930s. To simplify the
analysis, I assume that all work is done by non-Ricardian households.6
4.1. Household Problem
I’ll start with the Ricardian households. These households choose consumption cr and business







subject to crt + xbt = rtkbt + κrt − τctcrt − τxtxbt − τktkbt
− τpt
 








rtkbt − xbt − τktkbt − τxtxbt
− τpt
 
rtkbt − δkbt − τktkbt
 
6 I have also computed equilibria for a version of the model in which both types of households supply labor.
Codes for this alternative case are available at my website, www.minneapolisfed.org/research/economists.
19− τut ((1 + η)kbt+1 − kbt)
 
,
kbt+1 = [(1 − δ)kbt + xbt]/(1 + η)
xbt ≥ 0 in all states
with processes for factor prices, taxes, and transfers given. Quantities are in per capita terms. Nrt
is the number of family members, which is normalized to 1 initially. Growth in population is η.









subject to (1 + τc)cnr = (1 − τh)whb + κnr + yn − xn
h = hb + hn,
where κnr are government transfers to these households and yn−xn is net income from nonbusiness
activities. As in the earlier models, I assume that the nonbusiness variables are exogenous.
I next derive the necessary ﬁrst-order conditions that I use in the computer code. The La-














(rt − τkt)ˆ kbt + ˆ κrt
− τpt
 








(rbt − τkt)ˆ kbt − (1 + τxt) ˆ xbt
− τpt{(rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kbt
− τut{(1 + η)(1 + γ)ˆ kbt+1 − ˆ kbt}
 
− (1 + τct)ˆ crt − (1 + τxt) ˆ xbt
+ λt
 
(1 − δ)ˆ kbt + ˆ xbt − (1 + η)(1 + γ) ˆ kbt+1
  
.
Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to consumption and next period capital stocks.
They are as follows:
1/ˆ crt = (1 + τct) t
20ζ min(ˆ xbt,0)
2 + λt =  t (1 + τxt)(1 − τdt)
(1 + η)(1 + γ)(λt +  tτut (1 − τdt)) = ˜ βEt
 
λbt+1 (1 − δ)
+  t+1 (1 − τdt+1)
 
rt+1 − τkt+1 − τpt+1 (rt+1 − δ − τkt+1) + τut+1
  
.
Rewriting the dynamic ﬁrst-order conditions, I get
(1 + τxt + τut)(1 − τdt)
(1 + τct)ˆ crt
− ζ min(ˆ xbt,0)
2
= ˆ βE
  (1 − τdt+1)
(1 + τct+1)ˆ crt+1
{(1 − τpt+1)(rt+1 − τkt+1)
+ (1 − δ)(1 + τxt+1) + δτpt+1 + τut+1}




Turning next to the non-Ricardian consumers who solve a static problem, the relevant ﬁrst-
order condition is
ψ (1 − ht)
φ−1 (1 + τct)ˆ cnrt = (1 − τht) ˆ wt.
4.2. Factor Prices
Assume that the technology is
ˆ ybt = ˆ kθ
bt (zt [Nnrhbt])
1−θ .
Then factor prices are
rt = θˆ ybt/ˆ kbt
ˆ wt = (1 − θ) ˆ ybt/[Nnrhbt].
4.3. Government Budget Constraint
The government’s budget constraint, written in per capita and detrended terms, is given by
ˆ gt + κrt + Nnrκnr = τct [ˆ crt + Nnrˆ cnrt] + τht ˆ wtNnrhbt + τxtˆ xbt + τktˆ kbt
+ τpt{(rt − δ − τkt)ˆ kbt + τut{ˆ xbt − δˆ kbt}
21+ τdt{(rt − τkt)ˆ kbt − (1 + τxt) ˆ xbt
− τpt[(rt − δ − τkt) ˆ kbt
− τut
 




GDP in this economy (after normalizing) is
ˆ ct + ˆ xbt + Nnrˆ xnt + ˆ gt = ˆ ybt + Nnrˆ ynt.
4.5. Exogenous Processes
The exogenous variables for this model are {ˆ g,τc,τh,τx,τk,τp,τd,z,hn, ˆ xn, ˆ yn, ˆ κnr}. The state is
indexed by s. Therefore, the full state vector for the economy is [ˆ kb, s].
4.6. Computation















where the functions Φj(ˆ kb) are known basis functions. For the ﬁnite element method, the Φj(ˆ kb)’s
are low-order polynomials that are nonzero on small subdomains and the vector α satisﬁes
R
 
ˆ kb,s;  α
 
= (1 + τx (s) + τu (s))(1 − τd (s))/(1 + τc (s))
− ζˆ cr min(ˆ xb,0)










 (1 − τd (s′))





(1 − τp (s′))(r′ − τk (s′))
+ (1 − δ)(1 + τx (s′)) + δτp (s′) + τu (s′)
  
.
The main diﬀerence between the code for this model and the codes for the basic and extended
models is the intermediate ﬁxed point solved in the labor market. Here, I ﬁnd wages w that satisﬁes
the non-Ricardian budget constraint, starting with the states ˆ kb and s and a candidate solution
22ˆ cr. Speciﬁcally, I apply a standard Newton-Raphson routine to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of g(w) = 0,
where




(1 − θ)ˆ kθ
bz (s)
1−θ / ˆ w
 1/θ 
/Nnr
ˆ cnr = (1 − τh (s)) ˆ w(1 − hb − hn (s))/(ψ (1 + τc (s))).
4.7. Results
Next I consider simulations of three versions of the model. The ﬁrst has only variation in the ﬁscal
policies and the exogenous nonbusiness activities. In the second and third, I allow for time-varying
wedges to try to better ﬁt consumption and hours of work. I show that the model needs the added
wedges because the non-Ricardian households barely change their consumption without them.
Before computing the simulations, I need to choose parameters for the model. To parameterize
the model, I use the same procedure used for the earlier models. Growth is set at 1 percent for
population and 1.9 percent for technology. All other parameters—with the exception of the new
ones Nnr and κnr—are set by matching observations in 1929. For the new ones, I have no real
guidance from data without taking a stand on how segmented asset markets are. I chose Nnr = 10,
which implies a 10 to 1 ratio of non-Ricardians to Ricardians, and I chose per capita transfers to
non-Ricardians to be κnr such that Ricardians received no transfers, κr = 0.
In Figures 61–66, I show the results for the three simulations. In all cases I choose transfers
for the non-Ricardian households so that κrt remains at zero. Notice that in the version of the
model with no wedges, total consumption still rises (although by less than in the extended model
of Section 3). Wages and transfers need to fall signiﬁcantly in order to generate a large decline in
their consumption, which does not happen in this experiment. When I add variation in the labor
or eﬃciency wedges, I can then generate signiﬁcant declines in consumption for non-Ricardian
households. Overall, the ﬁt is best in the experiment with a labor wedge added. But, as before,
we are left in need of a theory for these time-varying wedges.
235. Model with Intangible Capital
Here, I consider an extension of the stochastic growth model that has both tangible and intangible
capital. As in the extended model, I also include more taxes than Cole and Ohanian (1999).
The motivation for including intangible capital is the fact that a signiﬁcant amount of this
type of capital investment is expensed and thus nontaxable; this includes investment in advertising,
R&D, and organizational capital. It has been argued that the stock of intangible capital at the
start of the Great Depression was already large, and with taxes rising during the 1930s, companies
had an incentive to further increase their intangible investments.7 As a trustee of the Museum of
Science and Industry noted in 1936, with taxes rising, “many manufacturers have concluded that
it will be better business judgment to spend money for business promotion, advertising, newspaper
campaigns, technical research, etc., in which they get full beneﬁt of each dollar in building up
business” (New York Times, July 23, 1936). This shift from tangible to intangible investment is
also evident in statistics on R&D employment. For example, Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) report
that between 1933 and 1940, employment of scientists and engineers in two-digit manufacturing
industries nearly tripled, rising from 10,927 to 27,777, and the number of scientiﬁc personnel per
1,000 wage earners doubled, rising from 1.93 to 3.67.
The inclusion of intangible investments also potentially addresses concerns of Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2007), who apply a business cycle accounting exercise to the 1930s and show
that models with frictions manifested primarily as eﬃciency wedges and labor wedges are needed
to account for ﬂuctuations during this period. The inclusion of both intangible investment and
time-varying taxes implies time variation in these key wedges.
5.1. Household Problem
I’ll start with the household’s problem. The problem is to choose consumption ct, hours ht, and




βt[log(ct) + ψ ((1 − ht)
ϕ − 1)/ϕ]Nt
7 See, for example, Fisher (1930, Chapters 8 and 9) for evidence of industrial research and inventions and
improved methods of management engineering.
24subject to
ct + xTt + qtxIt ≤ rTtkTt + rItkIt + wtht + κt
− τctct − τhtwtht + τbt (1 − χ)qtxIt
− τxtxTt − τktkTt
− τpt
 








rTtkTt + rItkIt − xTt − χqtxIt − τktkTt − τxtxTt
− τpt
 
rTtkTt + rItkIt − δTkTt
− χqtxIt − τktkTt
 
− τut ((1 + η)kTt+1 − kTt)
 
, (5.1)
taking as given the initial capital stocks, factor prices (rTt, rIt, wt), other incomes (κ), and
exogenous shocks. Hours are the sum of business hours hbt = h1
bt +h2
bt and nonbusiness hours hnt.
Constraints that must be satisﬁed in addition to the budget constraint are the capital accu-
mulation equations:
kTt+1 = [(1 − δT)kTt + xTt]/(1 + η)
kIt+1 = [(1 − δI)kIt + xIt]/(1 + η)
and nonnegativity constraints on investment: xTt ≥ 0 and xIt ≥ 0. Again, note that I am assuming
that households own the capital stocks and pay all taxes directly without loss of generality.
Also, I will assume, as in McGrattan and Prescott (2010), that nonbusiness income, invest-
ment, and hours are given exogenously. Here, they will be indexed by the state s.
Before deriving ﬁrst-order conditions for the problem, I ﬁrst modify the objective of the






[β (1 + η)]
t
 









If ζ = 0, this is the utility deﬁned above.




[β (1 + η)]
t
 












(rTt − τkt)ˆ kTt + rItˆ kIt + (1 − τht) ˆ wtht + ˆ κt
− τpt
 








(rTt − τkt)ˆ kTt + rItˆ kIt − χqtˆ xIt − (1 + τxt) ˆ xTt
− τpt{(rTt − δT − τkt)ˆ kTt + rItˆ kIt − χqtˆ xIt}
− τut{(1 + η)(1 + γ) ˆ kTt+1 − ˆ kTt}
 
− (1 + τct)ˆ ct − (1 + τxt) ˆ xTt − (1 − (1 − χ)τbt)qtˆ xIt
+ λTt
 




(1 − δI)ˆ kIt + ˆ xIt − (1 + η)(1 + γ)ˆ kIt+1
  
.
Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, and next period capital
stocks. They are as follows:
1/ˆ ct = (1 + τct) t
ψ (1 − ht)
ϕ−1 =  t (1 − τht) ˆ wt
ζ min(ˆ xTt,0)
2 + λTt =  t (1 + τxt)(1 − τdt)
ζ min(ˆ xIt,0)
2 + λIt =  tqt[(1 − χ)(1 − τht) + χ(1 − τpt)(1 − τdt)]
(1 + η)(1 + γ)(λTt +  tτut (1 − τdt)) = ˜ βEt
 
λTt+1 (1 − δT)
+  t+1 (1 − τdt+1)
 
rTt+1 − τkt+1 − τpt+1 (rTt+1 − δT − τkt+1) + τut+1
  
(1 + η)(1 + γ)λIt = ˜ βEt
 
λIt+1 (1 − δI)
+  t+1 (1 − τpt+1)(1 − τdt+1)rIt+1
 
.
Rewriting the dynamic ﬁrst-order conditions, I get
(1 + τxt + τut)(1 − τdt)
(1 + τct)ˆ ct
− ζ min(ˆ xTt,0)
2
26= ˆ βE
  (1 − τdt+1)
(1 + τct+1)ˆ ct+1
{(1 − τpt+1)(rTt+1 − τkt+1)
+ (1 − δT)(1 + τxt+1) + δTτpt+1 + τut+1}
− ζ (1 − δT)min(ˆ xTt+1,0)
2
 
qt [(1 − χ)(1 − τht) + χ(1 − τpt)(1 − τdt)]
(1 + τct)ˆ ct




(1 + τct+1)ˆ ct+1
{(1 − τdt+1)(1 − τpt+1)rIt+1
+ (1 − δI)qt+1[(1 − χ)(1 − τht+1)
+ χ(1 − τpt+1)(1 − τdt+1)]}










 θ1  
ˆ kIt









 θ2  
ˆ kIt





where the total tangible capital (in business) is ˆ kTt = ˆ k1
Tt+ˆ k2
Tt and total hours is ht = h1
t +h2
t +hnt.
The factor prices are
rTt = θ1ˆ ybt/ˆ k1
Tt = θ2qtˆ xIt/ˆ k2
Tt
rIt = (φ1ˆ ybt + φ2qtxIt)/ˆ kIt
ˆ wt = (1 − θ1 − φ1) ˆ ybt/h1
t = (1 − θ2 − φ2)qtˆ xIt/h2
t.
5.3. Government Budget Constraint
The government’s budget constraint, written in per capita and detrended terms, is given by
ˆ gt + ˜ κt = τctˆ ct + τht ˆ wtht + τbt (1 − χ)qtxIt + τxtˆ xTt + τktˆ kTt
+ τpt{(rTt − δT − τkt)ˆ kTt + rItˆ kIt − χqtˆ xIt}
27+ τut{ˆ xTt − δTˆ kTt}
+ τdt{(rTt − τkt) ˆ kTt − (1 + τxt) ˆ xTt + rItˆ kIt − χqtˆ xIt
− τpt[(rTt − δT − τkt) ˆ kTt + rItˆ kIt − χqtˆ xIt]
− τut
 
ˆ xTt − δTˆ kTt
 
},
where ˜ κ = ˆ κ + ˆ whn + ˆ xn − ˆ yn.
5.4. Resource Constraint
GDP in this economy (after normalizing) is
ˆ ybt + ˆ ynt = ˆ ct + ˆ xTt + ˆ xnt + ˆ gt.
Total output is ˆ ybt + ˆ ynt + qtˆ xIt.
5.5. Exogenous Processes
The exogenous variables for this model are {ˆ g,τc,τh,τx,τk,τp,τd,z1,z2,hn, ˆ xn, ˆ yn}. The state is
indexed by s. Therefore, the full state vector for the economy is [ˆ kT, ˆ kI, s].
5.6. Computation



























The static ﬁrst-order conditions can be used to determine the current period variables, given
guesses for the decision variables c and xT and the state variables ˆ kT, ˆ kI, and all exogenous
variables. Start by guessing a value for h1 given c, ˆ kT, and ˆ kI. Then I have (in order):
ˆ yb = ˆ c + ˆ xT + ˆ g + (ˆ xn − ˆ yn)
ˆ w = (1 − θ1 − φ1) ˆ yb/h1
h = 1 − [(1 − τh) ˆ w/(ψ (1 + τc)ˆ c)]
1/(ϕ−1)
28h2 = h − h1 − hn
ξ = (1 − θ2 − φ2)h1/
 
(1 − θ1 − φ1)h2 
ˆ k1
T = θ1ξ/(θ2 + θ1ξ) ˆ kT,
where ξ = ˆ yb/(qˆ xI). If the guess for h1 is correct, then the following should hold exactly:




 θ1  
ˆ kI
 φ1  
h1 1−θ1−φ1 .
If it does not, then I update the guess for h1 and continue until convergence.
With values for ˆ kT
1 , ˆ w, and h2, I can back out
ˆ k2
T = ˆ kT − ˆ k1
T
qˆ xI = ˆ wh2/(1 − θ2 − φ2)




 θ2  
ˆ kI
 φ2  
h2 1−θ2−φ2
q = (qˆ xI)/ˆ xI.
Then, capital stocks can be updated given current period investments xT and xI.
The unknown coeﬃcients in (5.2) and (5.3), which I can stack into the vector   α, are set so
that the residuals of the two dynamic Euler equations are approximately zero. These residuals can
be written as follows:
R1
 
  k,s;  α
 
= (1 + τx (s) + τu (s))(1 − τd (s))/(1 + τc (s))
− ζˆ cmin(ˆ xT,0)










 (1 − τd (s′))




(1 − τp (s′))(r′
T − τk (s′))




  k,s;  α
 
= q[(1 − χ)(1 − τb (s)) + χ(1 − τd (s))(1 − τp (s))]/(1 + τc (s))
− ζˆ cmin(ˆ xI,0)















(1 − τd (s′))(1 − τp (s′))r′
I
+ (1 − δI)q′[(1 − χ)(1 − τb (s′))
+ χ(1 − τd (s′))(1 − τp (s′))
  
,
29where ˆ β = β(1 + γ)−σ and   k = (ˆ kT,ˆ kI). If I apply a standard ﬁnite element method, I ﬁnd   α to
ensure that weighted sums of residuals R1 and R2 are equal to zero.
As in the basic model, I take derivatives with respect to the unknown coeﬃcients in   α to speed
up the numerical algorithm.
5.7. Results
Next, I analyze the role of intangible capital—which is a ﬁrm’s untaxed alternative to business
tangible—for the main ﬁndings. I show that varying the parameters governing the size of intangible
capital, including fully turning it oﬀ (with φ set to 0), does not aﬀect the paper’s main results.
The results for the model with intangible capital are shown in Figures 67–70.
For my simulations, I set growth rates as follows: γ = 0.019 and η = 0.01. The time series
for nonbusiness activities are set exogenously to be equal to U.S. values. (The detrended paths
of nonbusiness hours, investment, and output are shown in Table B.1.) The parameter χ, which
governs the fraction of expensing done by capital owners, is set equal to 0.5 as in McGrattan and
Prescott (2010).
The remaining parameters are set so that aggregates in the model economy are equal to
their U.S. analogues in 1929. Speciﬁcally, in addition to the values of tax rates, government
spending, and nonbusiness variables discussed earlier, I use 1929 values from U.S. data for real GDP,
real consumption, real tangible business investment, real tangible business capital, real business
compensation measured as in NIPA, and per capita hours. This implies parameter values of ψ =
2.055, β = 0.98, δT = 0.0358, θ = 0.236, and φ = 0.113. Because the intangible depreciation rate
and the share of intangible capital in production φ cannot be separately identiﬁed, I normalize δI to
0 and show below that this choice is made without loss of generality. I compute equilibrium paths
starting with initial capital stocks consistent with 1929 observations and use the same transition
matrix for expectations as that discussed in the main paper (Table 2).
In Figures 67 through 70, I compare the main equilibrium paths for three diﬀerent parameter-
izations of the model with intangible capital to the benchmark without (φ = 0). In versions of the
model with intangible capital, I vary the fraction expensed by shareholders versus business owners
30and the depreciation rate.8 The parameterization with χ = .5 and δI = 0 assumes that half of
intangible investments are expensed by shareholders and that the depreciation rate on intangible
capital is zero. The two alternative parameterizations have a higher fraction of expensing done by
shareholders and equal depreciation rates for intangible and tangible investment.
As Figures 67–70 make clear, these alternatives generate similar model predictions. The main
ﬁnding that capital taxation had a signiﬁcant impact on economic activity in the 1930s is not
overturned by these alternative numerical experiments.
6. U.S. Postwar Episodes
The post-Depression time period provides additional opportunities to test the theory because the
United States has had several instances of large tax changes. Here, I reconsider several postwar
episodes using neoclassical theory as above. The ﬁrst episode, which is similar in many respects to
the Great Depression, is the period after 2004, which includes the Great Recession (2008–2009).
The second is the period 1990–2003, which, at the end, includes major policy changes enacted under
President Bush. I chose to begin in 1990 because I want to extend the analysis of McGrattan and
Prescott (2010)—who study the technology boom of the 1990s—by including details of the Bush
tax cuts. Finally, I discuss a period that includes two major tax reforms under President Reagan
and which brought about many changes in policy relevant for my theory.
6.1. Great Recession, 2008–2009
In this section, I consider the recent U.S. Great Recession (2008–2009) because it is a period in
which future income tax rates were uncertain, but the nature of the uncertainty is relatively easy
to model. For this period, as in the U.S. Great Depression, I ﬁnd that the timing and magnitude
of potential income tax changes are consistent with a large decline in U.S. investment. Before
describing the numerical experiments and the quantitative ﬁndings, I provide some detail about
the data used.
Figures 71–72 show estimates of the average marginal tax rates on labor and dividend income
8 In each case, the parameters of the model are recalibrated so that the model generates 1929 levels of consump-
tion, tangible investment, tangible capital, GDP, NIPA compensation, and hours comparable to levels in the
United States.
31over the period 2000–2010. As is clear from the ﬁgures, there were signiﬁcant changes in individ-
ual income tax policy occurring in the beginning of the decade when George W. Bush was the
U.S. President. The main policy changes are the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act in 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act in 2003. These policies—
commonly referred to as the Bush tax cuts—lowered average marginal income tax rates relative to
their 2000 level.
The tax rate on labor shown in Figure 71 is from Barro and Redlick (2011), and the tax rate on
dividend income is constructed using data on equity holdings and marginal rates from federal and
state income data. The details of the computation for the tax rate on dividend income are shown in
Table 1. The ﬁrst columns show the fraction of equity held in nontaxed accounts. Pensions include
equity holdings of private pension funds, life insurance companies, state and local government,
and federal government. These holdings are found in Table B.100.e of the Flow of Funds Accounts
(FOF) of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2000–2010). Holdings for individual retirement
accounts (IRAs) are found by multiplying total holdings shown in FOF Table L.225.i by an estimate
of the fraction that is equity based on data on mutual funds from the Investment Company Institute
(ICI). Speciﬁcally, I estimate the equity fraction to be the ratio of mutual fund IRA assets that
are equity to total assets found in ICI (2010, Figure A9). For these calculations, I assume that
hybrid accounts have an equal share of equity and debt. For nonproﬁt holdings, I take corporate
equity and mutual fund holdings from FOF Table L.100.a. I multiply the mutual fund holdings
by an estimate of the fraction that is equity. This equity fraction is estimated to be the ratio of
equity assets to total assets, with hybrid accounts again assumed to have an equal share of equity
and debt.
The source of data for the marginal tax rate that does not account for nontaxed entities is
the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM. (See Feenberg and Coutts, 1993,
and the NBER website.) There are two TAXSIM rates for dividend income on federal and state
tax returns: one on ordinary dividends and one on qualiﬁed dividends. I use a weighted average
of these rates with weights equal to the fraction of dividends of each type shown on federal tax
32Table 1. Average Marginal Tax Rates on Dividend Income, 2000–2010
Fraction of Equity in Nontaxed Accounts Tax Rates with Nontaxed
Pensions IRAs Nonproﬁts Total Excluded Included
2000 .342 .149 .048 .539 .336 .155
2001 .357 .161 .048 .565 .318 .139
2002 .384 .182 .048 .614 .307 .119
2003 .386 .170 .048 .604 .206 .082
2004 .393 .169 .048 .610 .209 .081
2005 .410 .178 .048 .636 .215 .078
2006 .408 .180 .048 .635 .224 .082
2007 .424 .202 .048 .674 .227 .074
2008 .404 .219 .048 .671 .215 .071
2009 .407 .205 .048 .660 .214 .073
2010 .403 .198 .048 .649 .215 .075
Note: Sources of underlying data are Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1945–2010), Investment Company Insti-
tute (2010,1997–2011), Feenberg and Coutts (1993), and U.S. Treasury (1916–2010).
forms. The ﬁnal column in Table 1 shows the constructed rate shown in Figure 72. This rate—
with nontaxed included—is found by multiplying the fraction of nontaxed equity by the weighted
average of TAXSIM rates—with nontaxed excluded.
As Figures 71 and 72 show, between 2000 and 2003, the policies enacted under President Bush
led to a signiﬁcant decline in these average marginal tax rates, from roughly 39 percent to a little
over 35 percent on labor income, and from a little over 15 percent to a little under 8 percent on
dividend income.
Relevant for household expectations are not only the tax policies but also the tax politics.
In 2004, Bush was reelected and urged Congress to make permanent the tax policies enacted in
2001 and 2003. By 2007, many of the Democrats campaigning for the job of U.S. President in 2008
promised to let the policies expire on schedule. When Barak Obama was elected, he sought to make
some of the legislated tax cuts permanent, but he also wanted tax rates of high earners to rise.
Gains by Republican candidates in the 2010 midterm elections shifted sentiments yet again, with
many Tea Party candidates promising to make the Bush tax policies permanent. As the deadline
33for expiration approached, proposals were made to extend the deadline, which was ultimately what
was done.
These events motivate my choice of expectations shown in Table 2. I assume that, with
the reelection of Bush in 2004, households expect the policies to be made permanent in 2011.
With time, they are less certain and put more weight on the possibility that the legislation will
expire as scheduled. For example, between 2007 and 2008, that expectation shifts, with households
putting increasing weight on the probability that the policies will expire. With Obama’s election,
households become almost certain that they will expire. Then, in 2010, sentiment changes and the
possibility of an extension is proposed.
The remaining model parameters are set in the same way as in the extended model during
the U.S. Great Depression. I set growth rates as follows: γ = 0.019 and η = 0.01. The parameter
χ, which governs the fraction of expensing done by capital owners, is set equal to 0.5. The other
parameters are set so that aggregates in the model economy are equal to their U.S. analogues over
the period 2005–2007. Speciﬁcally, I use averages over 2005–2007 from U.S. data for real GDP,
real consumption, real tangible business investment, real tangible business capital, real business
compensation measured as in NIPA, and per capita hours. This implies parameter values of
ψ = 1.3541, β = 0.98, δT = 0.0416, θ = 0.232, and φ = 0.123. As before, intangible depreciation is
normalized to 0 without loss of generality.
To simplify the analysis, I compute equilibrium paths, starting in 2004, assuming that the
only policies or inputs that might change over the sample period are average marginal income
tax rates, τht and τdt; in other words, I assume no time variation in other tax rates, government
spending, and nonbusiness activities. The only thing that I assume does change over the period
2004–2011 is household expectations of the expiration of the Bush policies. A change in policy is
never actually realized, so the tax rates on labor and dividend income stay at 35 percent and 7.8
percent, respectively, over the entire sample period. I abstract from all other changes considered
in simulations of the Great Depression.
The results are shown Figures 73–76. Two model predictions are displayed: one that assumes
that only τd is stochastic and one that assumes that both τd and τh are stochastic. I include both
to see how much each anticipated rate change aﬀects the results. Figure 73 shows that both model
34Table 2. Expectations for 2004–2011 Model Simulation
% Probability that Bush Tax Policies
Expectations Permanent Expire Extended
Formed in in 2011 in 2011 until 2013
2004 100 0 0
2005 90 10 0
2006 90 10 0
2007 80 20 0
2008 50 50 0
2009 10 90 0
2010 25 25 50
predictions are a surprisingly close match to observed tangible investment, which falls close to 60
percent by mid-2009. Of course, how quickly and how steeply it drops oﬀ in the model is a function
of the likelihood of an increase in tax rates. If the election of Obama had not had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on household expectations, the decline in investment would have been smaller.
In the case where households put some probability on both τd and τh rising in 2011, the drops
in model business value added (Figure 75) and hours of work (Figure 76) account for 20 percent
and 36 percent of the actual declines. Suppose, alternatively, that households assume that only
τd can possibly rise—say, because Obama increases rates on higher earners, who earn most of the
dividends, but not on lower earners, who earn most of the labor income. In this case, the drops
in model business value added and hours of work account for 28 percent and 45 percent of the
actual declines. In both simulations, model consumption shown in Figure 74 rises with increased
distributions as in the simulations for the Great Depression.
Overall, the lesson learned from the simulation for the U.S. Great Recession is much like the
lesson learned from the simulation for the U.S. Great Depression: anticipated changes in individual
income taxes can have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on economic activity.
6.2. Bush Tax Cuts, 2001–2003
In this section, I extend the analysis of McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and include the Bush tax
35cuts, which occur at the end of the period they studied. I show that incorporating the change in
tax policies yields results that are similar to theirs but do not rely on an assumption that there
was a technology bust in 2000 following the technology boom in the 1990s.
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) use a version of the model with intangible capital (Section 5)
with nonneutral technology change to study the technology boom of the 1990s. They begin their
study by noting that the standard real business cycle (RBC) model, in which productivity shocks
are important drivers of cyclical activity, does a terrible job in accounting for the 1990s—a period
that is arguably most appropriate for such a theory. In fact, they show that a standard RBC model
predicts a depressed rather than booming economy in the 1990s. Especially troubling is the boom
in hours that occurs coincidentally with a decline in compensation per hour.
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) hypothesize that productivity in production of intangibles
was abnormally high relative to productivity in production of ﬁnal goods and services. Since
intangible investments are not counted in GDP, but hours of work of those doing R&D and other
activities related to creating new intangible investments are counted with total hours, we would
expect lackluster TFP even if there indeed is a technology boom.
Here, I work with a stochastic version of their model, which is almost the same as the model
of intangible capital discussed in Section 5. The diﬀerence is that here I allow for diﬀerences in
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McGrattan and Prescott (2010) abstracted from variations in tax rates on dividend income.
Here, to keep things simple, I allow for variations in the tax rate on dividend income and the
productivities z1
t, z2
t —which are central to their theory—but abstract from all other time-varying
processes that they considered.
In Figures 77–79, I show the paths for the three exogenous variables that I use as inputs in
the model. In each ﬁgure, I show two series. The ﬁrst corresponds to the original McGrattan and
Prescott (2010) economy. The second is the alternative I want to consider. This alternative has
time variation in the tax rate on dividends and no absolute drop in TFP for either sector (once
36the variables are multiplied by the growth trend). This is the sense in which I mean that my
alternative simulation does not rely on a technology bust. In this case, technology booms during
the 1990s and reverts to its long-run growth trend without falling absolutely.
Next consider the expectations about these processes. To generate a nonneutrality and some





t)1−θ−φ, as functions of the same AR(1) process. Speciﬁcally I
construct an 11-state Markov chain for an AR(1) process lnst+1 = ρlnst + εt with εt ≃ N(0,σ2
ε).
I set A1
t equal to its steady state plus one times lnst and set A2
t equal to its steady state plus
two times lnst. The transition matrix is found by applying Tauchen’s (1986) method for a speciﬁc
value of ρ, which here I take to be 0.95. The value of σε is set so it is consistent with the shocks
during the 1990s.
For the simulation with variation in the tax rate on dividends, I assume that households do
not expect any change (from the 15 percent benchmark level) until 2000, the year when discussions
about tax cuts began in earnest. In 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
is enacted and households ﬁnd out that tax rates on income are now a bit lower. At this point
they put some weight on the probability that rates will fall further. In 2002, households put even
more weight on a rate fall, and, in 2003, such an event occurs.
The key results for the two simulations are shown in Figures 80–82. At the beginning of the
sample, the paths line up because the inputs and expectations are the same for the two simulations.
Starting in 2000 we see some diﬀerences, but both generate signiﬁcant drops in business investment,
output, and hours.
The fact that the results for a technology bust and a tax boon look similar is at ﬁrst coun-
terintuitive but upon further investigation makes perfect sense. The simulations for the economy
with time-varying tax rates on dividends mask an important theoretical factor. As soon as there
is any weight put on the possibility that taxes will come down in the future, ﬁrms lower their dis-
tributions by increasing investment. Once taxes start to come down, ﬁrms increase distributions
and hence lower their investment. In eﬀect, investment has an inverted V-shaped pattern. This
is the opposite of what happens in simulations for the U.S. Great Depression. At the beginning
of the Depression, ﬁrms increase their distributions by lowering investment, and once taxes start
37to rise, they decrease distributions and increase investment. Thus, in the case of the Depression,
there is a V-shaped pattern for investment.
6.3. Reagan Tax Cuts, 1981–1986
Finally, in this section, I discuss another interesting postwar period that includes two major tax
reforms, namely the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA). Although the impact of these reforms can in theory be analyzed with the models discussed
earlier, other factors must be taken into account, which make this time period much more diﬃcult
to analyze than those discussed earlier. The most important factors are early attempts to pass
ERTA and policies related to pension reform.
In Figure 83, I provide a partial timeline of some key policy changes that occurred between
1970 and 1989, along with a plot of business tangible investment, which is the most likely place
to look for eﬀects of policies related to capital taxation. The ﬁrst major policy change shown in
the ﬁgure is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which establishes
standards for pension plans of private employers and rules concerning the taxation of income in
employee beneﬁt plans.
In 1978, two major events occur. First, even before Reagan was elected, early attempts to pass
ERTA were made by Representative Jack Kemp and Senator William Roth. Although the bills
did not ultimately become law, many credit these congressmen with the legislation that ﬁnally did
pass when Reagan was President. A second important policy change was the Revenue Act of 1978,
and speciﬁcally a provision in section 401(k) that allowed employees to defer a certain amount of
compensation before paying income taxes.
A clariﬁcation of the Prudent Man Law under ERISA (section 404(a)) was made in 1979 and
would have been a partial impetus to greater sheltering of incomes from equities. Prior to ERISA,
equities were only a small component of retirement savings. Another relevant clariﬁcation, this
time by the Securities and Exchange Commission, is made in 1982 with their Rule 10b-18. This
rule clariﬁed guidelines for share repurchase programs and led to a signiﬁcant shift by ﬁrms from
issuing dividends to repurchasing shares. The reason for doing so was to take advantage of tax
38rate diﬀerences on dividends and capital gains. This advantage disappeared when TRA 1986 was
enacted.
As this brief history suggests, a lot of important changes during this period aﬀected both
the statutory tax rate on distributions—dividends and repurchases—and household expectations
about future tax rates. The period is an exciting one to study but also one that will require a more
detailed investigation of the many relevant policy changes.
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Figure 1. Population at Midyear






















Figure 2. Detrended Real GDP
































Figure 3. Detrended Real Consumption

































Figure 4. Detrended Real Investment
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Figure 5. Detrended Government Spending
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Figure 6. Detrended Nonbusiness Output
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Figure 7. Detrended Nonbusiness Investment

























Figure 8. New York Stock Exchange Market Value






































Figure 9. Per Capita Hours
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Figure 10. Per Capita Nonbusiness Hours
Data Sources: Kendrick (1961), U.S. Commerce (1975)
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Figure 11. Average Marginal Tax Rate on Labor Income


















Figure 12. Marginal Tax Rate Schedule for Dividend Income
Data Source: SOI, 1929–1939
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Figure 13. Average Marginal Income Tax Rate on Dividends
Data Sources: SOI, 1929–1939, Tax Research Foundation (1930–1942)





Statutory U.S. Tax Rate
on Profits
Smoothed Series Used in 
Benchmark Simulations
Figure 14. Statutory Tax Rate on Profits
Data Source: SOI (1929–1939)
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Figure 15. Effective Tax Rate on Business Property
Data Sources: SCB (1929–1939), SOI Bulletin (1990)
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Figure 17. Detrended Real Investment in the United States

























Figure 18. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States



























Figure 19. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and






























Figure 20. Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 21. Detrended Real Investment in the United States
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Figure 22. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States
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Figure 25. Detrended Real Business Investment in the United States

























Figure 26. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States




























Figure 27. Detrended Real Business GDP in the United States and































Figure 28. Business Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 29. Detrended Real Investment in the United States

























Figure 30. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States



























Figure 31. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and






























Figure 32. Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 33. Detrended Real Investment in the United States
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Figure 34. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States























τdt = 0%, all t
τut = 0%, all t
Extended Model:
U.S. Data
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Figure 37. Detrended Real Investment in the United States



























Figure 38. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States


























Figure 39. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and































Figure 40. Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 41. Detrended Real Investment in the United States
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Figure 42. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States
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Figure 45. Detrended Real Investment in the United States


























Figure 46. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States



























Figure 47. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and






























Figure 48. Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 49. Detrended Real Investment in the United States
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Figure 50. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States
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Figure 53. Detrended Real Investment in the United States






























Figure 54. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States































Figure 55. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and






























Figure 56. Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 57. Detrended Real Investment in the United States
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Figure 58. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States
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Figure 61. Detrended Real Investment in the United States



























Figure 62. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States



























Figure 63. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and































Figure 64. Hours Per Capita in the United States and


























Figure 65. Detrended Consumption of the Ricardian Households


























Figure 66. Detrended Consumption of the Non-Ricardian Households
in the Non-Ricardian Model, 1929–1939
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Figure 67. Detrended Real Investment in the United States and




























Figure 68. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States and



























Figure 69. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and Predictions
































Figure 70. Hours Per Capita in the United States and Predictions
of the Model with Intangible Capital, 1929–1939
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U.S. Individual Income Tax Rates, 2000–2010





Figure 71. Average Marginal Tax Rates on Labor Income
in the United States, 2000–2010





Figure 72. Average Marginal Tax Rates on Dividend Income
in the United States, 2000–2010
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Figure 73. Detrended Real Tangible Investment in the United States and
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Figure 74. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States and
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Figure 75. Detrended Real Business Value Added in the United States and
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Figure 76. Business Hours Per Capita in the United States and
Predictions of the Model with Intangible Capital, 2004:4–2011:1
79Figures 77–82.




























No Decline in 
Sector 1 TFP
Figure 77. TFP in the Final Goods and Services Sector in Two





























No Decline in 
Sector 2 TFP
Figure 78. TFP in the Intangible Investment Sector in Two
Versions of the Model with Intangible Capital, 1990–2003
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Figure 79. Tax Rate on Dividend Income in Two Versions
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Figure 80. Detrended Real Business Investment in the United States
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Figure 81. Detrended Real Business Value Added in the United States
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Figure 82. Hours Per Capita in the United States and
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Figure 83. Detrended Real Business Tangible Investment in the
United States and Major Policy Changes, 1970–1990
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